[This post was written by David, and posted by Stefano on his behalf]
This morning, a unanimous U.S. Supreme Court ruled that
claims directed to computer-implemented methods and related systems are not
eligible for patenting under 35 U.S.C. § 101 unless they contain a
non-conventional “inventive concept,” and that a generic reference to a general
purpose computer, or even “purely functional and generic” hardware components, does
not make an otherwise ineligible invention patentable. The complete opinion is
here.
Although the decision (by Justice Thomas) falls short of a
bright-line test for patent eligibility, it does elaborate on the two-step
analysis that should be applied.
First the Court must decide whether the subject matter claimed
is directed to a patent-ineligible law of nature, natural phenomenon, or
abstract idea. The Court reasoned that the intermediated settlement concept claimed
in the Alice patents was not meaningfully different from the concept of risk
hedging found to be ineligible in Bilski.
Like the Court in Bilski, however,
the Court avoided defining “abstract idea,” instead stating that “we need not
labor to delimit the precise contours of the ‘abstract ideas’ category in this
case.” Slip op. at 10.
Second, if the claims are directed to an ineligible concept,
then the Court framed the second step based on Mayo’s “inventive concept” requirement:
If [step one is met], we then
ask, “[w]hat else is there in the claims before us?” [Mayo,] slip op., at 9. To
answer that question, we consider the elements of each claim both individually
and “as an ordered combination” to determine whether the additional elements
“transform the nature of the claim” into a patent-eligible application. Id., slip
op., at 10, 9. We have described step two of this analysis as a search for
an ‘inventive concept’ - i.e., an element or combination of elements that is
“sufficient to ensure that the patent in practice amounts to significantly more
than a patent upon the [ineligible concept] itself.” Id. slip op., at 3.
To apply this second step, the Court noted that the claims
must recite some element that is an “inventive concept” sufficient to
“transform” the claimed abstract idea into a patent eligible invention. On this
point, the Court cautioned that merely reciting a generic computer, or even
conventional computer components or function, is inadequate. “[I]f a patent’s
recitation of a computer amounts to a mere instruction to ‘implement’ an
abstract idea "on … a computer," that addition cannot impart patent
eligibility.” Slip op. at 13, quoting
Mayo.
Applying the two-step test to Alice’s claims, the Court
found them to be ineligible. First, the method claims were addressed to the
abstract concept of settlement intermediation. Second, although the claims
recited computer-implemented steps, those steps (alone or in combination) were
“purely conventional.” The Court concluded that the claims did not improve the
functioning of the computer, or reflect an improvement in any other technology
or field. “Instead, the claims at issue amount to ‘nothing significantly more’
than an instruction to apply the abstract idea of intermediated settlement
using some unspecified, generic computer.” Slip
op. at 15. Therefore, the claims were ineligible for patenting.
Alice’s system claims fared no better under the two-step
test. Although the system claims recited specific hardware components (such as
“data storage unit” and “communications controller”), the Court dismissed those
elements as “purely functional and generic.” Slip op. at 16. As a result, the elements did not provide meaningful
limitations, and only linked the concept to a particular technological
environment – in this instance implementing the concept using a computer. The
Court reasoned:
Put another way, the system
claims are no different from the method claims in substance. The method claims
recite the abstract idea implemented on a generic computer ;the system claims
recite a handful of generic computer components configured to implement the
same idea. This Court has long “warn[ed] . . . against” interpreting §101 “in
ways that make patent eligibility ‘depend simply on the draftsman’s art.’” Mayo, slip op., at 3.
As a result, the system claims were also ineligible.
Justice Sotomayor, joined by Justices Breyer and Ginsburg,
concurred in the result, noting their belief that business method patents are
ineligible per se.
No comments:
Post a Comment