Wednesday, 28 August 2013

CIPA Congress and IPAG Conference: a reminder

The Chartered Institute of Patent Attorneys' CIPA Congress 2013 takes place on 3 and 4 October at the Lancaster London Hotel. There's a full and challenging programme, as well as the President's Dinner at which Mr Justice Birss -- formerly of the Patents County Court, England and Wales, and now of the Patents Court -- is the guest speaker.

Amon the many attractions is a session on the effect of non-practising entities on patent strategy, looking at both litigation and transactional options. Participants in this session are Greg Corcoran (Corporate Intellectual Property, ASML), Nicola Dagg (Allen & Overy), Gwilym Roberts (Kilburn & Strode) and George Whitten (Qualcomm Europe, Inc). There is also a session on patent litigation options in the new Europe, featuring David Barron (Wragge & Co LLP), David Rosenberg (GlaxoSmithKline) and Claudia Tapia (BlackBerry, Germany).

Full details of the programme, and information on how to register, is accessible here; the Early Bird discount rate expires this Friday, 30 August.

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The 10th annual IPAG (Intellectual Property Administrators Group) Conference is being held at the same time in the same venue.  You can check out the IPAG's increasingly adventurous programme here.  There are “mix n’match discounts available ranging from 10% -25%!”, which may be particularly attractive if you are one of a number of IP administrators from the same company or firm.  

Monday, 26 August 2013

Austria tidies up appeals against office decisions

Austria has recently introduced a system of new provincial administrative courts which, it is said, will affect administrative provisions in several intellectual property statutes, including Austria's Patent Act and Act on Utility Models. The amendments mainly concern the reorganisation of appeal procedures. Currently, appeals against decisions of the Patent Office's technical and legal departments are raised with the Office's complaint department, whose decisions can be challenged, as can the decisions of the nullification department (which handles nullification applications) with the Supreme Patent and Trade Mark Board.

However, with effect from 1 January 2014, everything will be different. Following dissolution of the Office's complaint department, the Patent Office will handle only first instance proceedings, and appeals against decisions of the Office's technical, legal and nullification departments will be filed with the Vienna Higher Regional Court. Decisions of the Vienna Appellate Court can still be challenged before the Supreme Court -- but only if stringent prerequisites for appeal are satisfied.

Parties may be represented at the Patent Office and the Vienna Higher Regional Court by attorneys, patent attorneys and notaries public, but only attorneys have the right of audience in Supreme Court proceedings.

Source: note by Ferdinand Graf and Claudia Csáky (Graf & Pitkowitz Rechtsanwälte GmbH), published by International Law Office

Current Patent Lawyer magazine

Looking for something to read? The July/August issue of The Patent Lawyer magazine has plenty of easy-read material, even though there's not a great deal in this specific issue to rivet the attention of the patent litigation enthusiast. There is however a special country focus on patents and litigation in Sweden, which will no doubt be of particular interest to anything thinking of or expecting to litigate there.

Friday, 23 August 2013

Revision of German Patent Act Finally Accepted

Good News for DPMA President
Cornelia Rudloff-Schäffer

Both the German Bundestag and the German Bundesrat have now accepted the proposal for a revision of the German Patent Act previously discussed here.

The main features include:
  •  the possibility of online file inspection after the publication of the application,
  • an extension of the delay for filing a German translation of the application documents for applications filed in English or French language from previously three months to twelve months from the filing date or fifteen months from the priority date, if the latter date is earlier, and
  • an extension of the search report, so as to include a preliminary opinion on patentability.
The original proposal was modified by adding the exclusion of “plants and animals” obtained only by such methods “to the exclusion of essentially biological processes for the production of plants and animals" in § 2a (1) Nr. 1 of the German Patent Act to thereby address questions raised in the second referral to the enlarged board of appeal in the “Broccoli” case T0083/05 at the EPO.
 
Most of the amendments will enter into force with a delay of 6 months from the publication of the law, i.e. in February or March 2014 in order to allow for some technical preparations in the DPMA.


Patent Litigation and Competition Law in India II

Here's the second post from our good friend and blogging colleague from India, J. Sai Deepak, founder of The Demanding Mistress intellectual property and innovation weblog. Both pieces focus on areas of interplay between patents and competition law.
In my previous post, I discussed certain situations under Indian law which could attract both the Patents Act and the Competition Act. Continuing in the same vein, this post discusses the interaction between the two sets of legislation in instances of abuse of dominance. 
Section 4 of the Competition Act recognizes abuse of dominance by an “enterprise” or a “group”. Section 2(h) of the same Act exhaustively defines an “enterprise”, which includes a person, natural or juristic. As for the definition of a “group”, this is provided for in the Explanation to Section 5. 
In order to establish abuse of dominance by a patentee, the first ingredient to be established is that the patentee enjoys a position of dominance in the relevant market. As to what constitutes “relevant market”, Section 19(5) states that the Competition Commission of India (CCI) could have regard to either the “relevant geographic market” or the “relevant product market”. 
In assessing whether a patentee enjoys a dominant position in the relevant market, Section 19(4) of the Competition Act lists a host of factors which the CCI must have due regard to. Some of the factors include the market share of the enterprise and the economic power of the enterprise including commercial advantages over competitors. Critically, Section 19(4)(g) also recognizes the following factor to establish the patentee’s dominant position: 
monopoly or dominant position whether acquired as a result of any statute or by virtue of being a Government company or a public sector undertaking or otherwise” 
The above-underscored portion is wide enough to include a patent grant which could bestow a monopoly or a dominant position in the relevant market. Therefore, if an aggrieved party is able to establish that the existence of a patent on a particular technology has resulted in the patentee acquiring a position of dominance, that alone is sufficient to satisfy the first and basic ingredient of Section 4 i.e. position of dominance of the patentee. 
The second ingredient of abuse of dominant position is dealt with by Section 4(2) of the Competition Act, which lists a host of situations that could amount to abuse of dominance. For instance, imposition of an unfair or discriminatory price in purchase or sale (including predatory price) of goods or services amounts to abuse of dominance. What is important is that the Act recognizes and distinguishes between “unfair price”, “discriminatory price” and “predatory price”. Each of these clearly is capable of having distinct meanings. 
Since the interface between the Patents Act and Competition Act is being discussed, it is important to understand the position of these legislations on similar or identical or related issues. For instance, while the Competition Act refers to “unfair price”, Section 84(1)(b) of the Patents Act (Section 84 being the compulsory licence provision) refers to a “reasonably affordable price”. How does one harmonize the interpretations of “unfair price” under the Competition Act and “reasonably affordable price” under the Patents Act? Is harmonization necessary since, as stated in my previous post, Section 60 of the Competition Act states that the Competition Act shall prevail over all other legislations or provisions in other legislations which are “inconsistent” with it? Although the Patents Act may be treated as the “parent legislation” which governs patents and patentees, Section 60 of the Competition Act ensures that the latter prevails over the Patents Act. 
An exercise in harmonization is necessary because the overriding effect of Section 60 of the Competition Act can take effect only when it is established that two provisions are “inconsistent” i.e. they are in conflict with each other. If, however, harmonization is possible without distortion of the objects or language of either legislation, Section 60 must be the option of last resort. So how does one harmonize “unfair price” with “reasonably affordable price”? It must be borne in mind that both “unfair price” and “reasonably affordable price” judge the cost of the transaction through the prism of the effect of the price on the licensee, as opposed to the proportionality between the price demanded and the value of the technology being licensed. In other words, “fairness” of a price may be the same as its “reasonable affordability”, but it is distinct from “reasonable price”. 
Therefore, it could be said that both the Patents Act and the Competition Act are in harmony with each other when they require the cost of a licence to be fair/reasonably affordable. In fact, so long as there is no conflict between the two requirements, it could be said that what is “reasonably affordable” under the Patents Act would be “fair” under the Competition Act. 
Having said this, it would be banal to state that to decide what is unfair or not reasonably affordable, it may be necessary to first determine what is fair or reasonably affordable, which probably calls for use of econometrics, and not just wordplay. In situations like these, the CCI has the power to farm out certain issues, such as licence fees, for the consideration of and determination by the Controller General of Patents. Under Section 21A of the Competition Act, the CCI could refer the issue of determination of licence fees to the Controller General of Patents before taking a final call on the issue of unfair pricing. In the alternative, in certain situations, the CCI may first record a finding of unfair pricing and then refer the matter to the Controller General of Patents for determination of a fair price. 
The situation discussed in this post is but one possible scenario. However, the larger point being made here is that there exists a plethora of options outside of the Patents Act in patent-related matters, and it would help to consider them in bringing about the desired outcome, instead of restricting oneself to only the Patents Act.

Wednesday, 21 August 2013

New Rules provide for the Intellectual Property Enterprise Court

The Civil Procedure (Amendment No.7) Rules 2013 (SI 2013/1974) come into force on 1 October 2013.  These Rules feature, among other thingss, amendments to the Civil Procedure Rules (CPR) which are made in consequence of the renaming of the Patents County Court for England and Wales as the Intellectual Property Enterprise Court -- which is being reconstituted as a specialist division of the High Court's, Chancery Division.

The Rules amend Part 45 (fixed costs) and Part 63 (intellectual property claims), and include the inevitable transitional and savings provisions.  Consequential amendments are also being made to the Practice Directions to Parts 45 and 63 of the CPR, and to the Practice Direction to Part 30, which concerns the transfer of actions between courts.

Tuesday, 20 August 2013

The interplay between patent litigation and competition law in India I

Our good friend and blogging colleague from India, J. Sai Deepak, founder of The Demanding Mistress intellectual property and innovation weblog, has kindly written two pieces specially for PatLit, of which this is the first.  The second, which PatLit looks forward to publishing soon, will discuss a few more areas of interplay between patents and competition law.
Patent litigation all over the world has gradually moved beyond its standard template which typically involves suits for infringement, counterclaims for patent invalidation or contractual disputes. Since the conduct of warring parties has a bearing on competition and consumers, competition law is gradually beginning to make its presence felt, even in India. In this post, I shall deal with some of the situations where there is interplay between the Indian Patents Act 1970 and the Indian Competition Act 2002. 
Although the Patents Act is typically associated with patent grant and enforcement, Section 140 of the Act lists those restrictive covenants whose presence in patent-related contracts is forbidden for being unfair or discriminatory. The Section, among other things, expressly proscribes any contractual provision that envisages exclusive grant-back or prevents challenges by a licensee to the validity of a licensed patent or enables coercive package licensing by the patentee/licensor. Such contractual clauses may also attract Section 4 of the Competition Act, which deals with abuse of dominant position, provided the ingredients of the Section are satisfied. 
In other words, in limited situations, the manner of patent exploitation and enforcement and its effect on the market is capable of attracting both the Patents Act and the Competition Act. For instance, a patentee may be in a position to dictate licence terms, including exorbitant licence fees, to others players in the market who seek access to his proprietary technology. Subject to certain conditions being satisfied, it is possible to invoke the compulsory licensing (CL) mechanism provided for under Section 84 of the Patents Act to moderate the terms of the licence. Here too, it is also possible to assess the fairness of the patentee’s terms through the prism of Section 4 of the Competition Act. 
 The difference between the two mechanisms is that Section 84 requires the applicant for a CL to wait for three years from the date of patent grant to move a CL application, whereas one need not wait for three years under the Competition Act to complain against abuse of dominance. Also, under the Patents Act, one needs to satisfy the requirement of being a “person interested” within the meaning of Section 2(1)(t) to move a CL application (I have written elsewhere in detail on the interpretation of the definition of a “person interested”), whereas anyone can file an information for abuse of dominance under the Competition Act. 
A question that may arise is whether the same relief may be granted by both the Controller General of Patents and the Competition Commission of India (CCI). Under Section 84(4) of the Patents Act, the Controller General has the power to determine the terms of a compulsory licence. Under Section 27 of the Competition Act, the CCI has the power, among other things to modify the terms of the hitherto abusive agreement, besides imposing a penalty. 
Further, Section 28 of the Competition Act empowers the CCI to divide the abusive enterprise to ensure that it is never in a position to abuse its dominance. Pertinently, Section 28(2) of the Competition Act envisages “transfer or vesting of property, rights, liabilities or obligations”. In other words, Sections 27 and 28 together allow the CCI to create an interest by a way of a licence in favour of a third party on terms that the CCI deems fit. Clearly, the CCI has broader and much more lethal powers than the Controller General. 
What is critical to note is that Section 60 of the Competition Act states that the Act “shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any other law for the time being in force”. In other words, this Act has an overriding effect over all other laws, including the Patents Act. Critically, once the ball is set rolling under the Competition Act, the informant or complainant does not have the option of pulling back since, if the CCI sees merit in the information or complaint, it takes over. The informant then merely assists the CCI. Therefore, the choice of the legal option to be employed depends entirely on the outcome desired by an aggrieved party.

Monday, 19 August 2013

Hamilton v Sunbeam: when outsourcing triggers the on-sale bar

On Wednesday, the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit issued an interesting judgment in Hamilton Beach Brands Inc. v Sunbeam Products Inc., affirming the applicability of the on-sale bar in a case where the invalidating offer for sale came from a foreign supplier, which the patent holder had asked to manufacture products embodying the patent invention. The dissenting opinion argued, instead, that the majority failed to evaluate the commercial nature of the offer for sale, and the experimental purpose of the purchase order. Under the pre-AIA 35 USC § 102(b), the on-sale bar prevented the patentability of an invention which was on sale in the US more than one year prior to the date of the patent application: the rule aimed at obtaining widespread disclosure of new inventions as soon as possible, and at preventing the inventor from commercially exploiting the exclusivity of his invention substantially beyond the statutorily authorised period (RCA Corp. v Data Gen. Corp.). The Supreme Court, in Pfaff v Wells Electronics Inc., clarified that the on-sale bar is applicable to an invention which (i) is the subject of a commercial offer for sale not primarily for experimental purposes, and (ii) is ready for patenting.

On February 8, 2005, Hamilton Beach issued a purchase order to its supplier for the manufacture of almost 2000 units of its Stay or Go® slow cookers (electrically heated pots used for cooking food at low temperatures); on February 25, the supplier confirmed receiving the order, adding that it would begin production upon receipt of Hamilton Beach's release. On March 1, 2006, Hamilton Beach filed a patent application, later issued as US Patent No. 7,485,831, claiming a portable 'slow cooker' equipped with clips, mounted on its body, to seal the detachable lid. The company brought the invention to the market through its line of Stay or Go® slow cookers. Sunbeam, a direct competitor in the small kitchen appliance sector, soon marketed the competing slow cooker Cook & Carry®, which featured sealing clips mounted on the lid of the pot. Hamilton Beach subsequently filed a continuation of its original application, claiming a slow cooker with lid-mounted clips. When the patent was issued in 2011 as US Patent No. 7,947,928, the patent holder immediately filed suit against Sunbeam for infringement.

The District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia ruled out infringement, and found the '928 patent to be invalid. This was because (i) it was not entitled to an earlier filing date because Hamilton Beach had added new matter when it had filed its continuation, and the sales of the Stay or Go® slow cooker, begun more than one year before that date, triggered the on-sale bar; and (ii) even if the patent was entitled to an earlier priority date, Hamilton Beach's purchase order with a foreign supplier constituted an invalidating commercial offer for sale.

The Federal Circuit limited its review to the applicability of § 102(b) to Hamilton Beach's purchase order with its supplier, and employed, as the earlier critical date, the date most favourable to the plaintiff (March 1, 2005 - one year before the '831 filing date). From the outset, citing Special Devices Inc. v OEA Inc., the court noted that 'there is no "supplier exception" to the on-sale bar'; further, even if the commercial offer for sale was made by a foreign entity, it fell under § 102(b), as it was directed to a US customer at its place of business in the US. The decision then analysed the District Court's reliance on Linear Tech. Corp. v Micrel Inc., under which the transmission of a purchase order, before the critical date, from a manufacturer to a supplier, which fulfils the order by manufacturing the requested items, constitutes an offer to buy, which 'amounts to an invalidating sale under § 102(b) as long as the offer is accepted and a binding contract to sell is formed'.

The court observed that Linear Tech (and thus the requirement of a binding contract) was factually distinguishable: in the case in hand, Hamilton Beach's supplier had, before the critical date, (i) confirmed receipt of the purchase order, and (ii) stated that it was ready to fulfil it upon release. Reciting previous case law, the decision clarified that a commercial offer for sale 'is one which the other party could make into a binding contract by simple acceptance', and held that the supplier's offer to sell the slow cookers to Hamilton Beach, which the latter could have made into a binding contract by simple acceptance, 'was enough to satisfy Pfaff's first prong without the need for a binding contract', even if the plaintiff provided the release only after the critical date.

Assessing whether the invention was 'ready for patenting' before the critical date, the Federal Circuit found that evidence of pre-critical date meetings with representatives of retail customers, during which detailed descriptions and drawings of the Stay or Go® slow cooker had been presented, was enough to satisfy the requirement. Although Hamilton Beach alleged that, before the critical date, its prototypes did not meet the '928 patent claim that the seals prevented any leakages from the interior of the pot, the court held that '[g]iven the relative simplicity of the invention, the descriptions and drawings Hamilton Beach showed to its retail customers and the specifications provided to its supplier [were] sufficiently enabling and, as an admitted commercial embodiment of the patent-in-suit, would meet every limitation of the asserted claims'. In this perspective, it was noted that the addition of minor improvements ('fine-tuning') to the invention after the critical date 'does not mean that the invention was not ready for patenting'.

Judge Reyna, in his dissenting opinion, argued that 'with no review of whether the offer was commercial in nature, the majority in this case has extended the no-supplier-exception rule to a case without considering whether the purchase order was placed for purely experimental purposes'. Although the majority noted that the plaintiff had not asserted an experimental use defence, the dissenting judge argued that Hamilton Beach's order appeared to be for experimental purpose, as, at the time, the company was still struggling to refine the invention in order to prevent food leakages, and the order was not the result of customer demand or projections. Thus, he concluded that:
My greatest concerns involve the implications this case will have for future innovators, most notably small enterprises and individual inventors who lack in-house prototyping and fabricating capabilities. […] Whenever the development process requires those entities to manufacture working prototypes or pre-mass-production samples, they often have no choice but to reach out to third party suppliers. Under the majority’s holding in this case, a single offer to buy for purely experimental purposes may trigger the on-sale bar, and the experimental-use exception will offer them no salvation.
The Federal Circuit's decision is likely to attract significant debate, as many companies rely on third party suppliers for manufacturing both their prototypes and final products. At first sight, the judgment appears to blur the line between a transaction of commercial nature and one justified by experimental purposes, as highlighted by Judge Reyna, and to arbitrarily extend the on-sale bar to the outsourcing of those prototyping activities which relate to the fine-tuning of the invention. A deeper look suggests, however, that, while the decision would have benefited from a more open discussion of these issues, the Federal Circuit did not depart from its established case law. On one side, the majority clarified that its opinion 'will not “eviscerate” [the experimental-use] defense', as it was neither raised, nor examined in the case. On the other, where such defence does not apply, the applicability of the on-sale bar appears justified by the policy considerations surrounding § 102(b), which favour the prompt disclosure of inventions ready for patenting, over commercial considerations which may delay their availability to the public. Although this balance lies on an evaluation which is subjective in nature, as a company may assess its invention's readiness through different criteria than those employed by a public authority, filing a patent application as early as possible is usually both a viable and a sensitive remedy. The changes introduced by the America Invents Act could, however, alter the functioning of the on-sale bar, as the sale must now make the invention available to the public (see the USPTO Guidelines II.B. 1.d), in order to trigger an invalidating effect.

Wednesday, 14 August 2013

A Scottish Claim Construction Hearing?

Judgment was delivered yesterday by the Outer House of the Scottish Court of Session in Total Containment Engineering Ltd v Total Waste Management Alliance Ltd [2013] CSOH 135 in a matter which may be of great interest to those who love procedural rules as much as they love the substantive law.  The following note has been penned for PatLit by Gill Grassie, a partner in the Scottish IP practice of Brodies LLP (thanks,Gill!).  This is how it goes:
Under Scottish court procedure there is hearing known as a Debate, at which the issues in the case are argued on the basis of what is set out in the pleadings. No evidence is led and the focus is solely on legal arguments. A Debate can be a very effective and cost-efficient tool to decide a case quickly and finally  -- for example on grounds of lack of jurisdiction or title or lack of a relevantly made out case. 
A Debate was employed in this patent case by the alleged infringer to try to secure a dismissal of the action. It argued that the case as pleaded by the pursuer (claimant) on the meaning of the relevant claims meant that those claims did not cover the allegedly infringing equipment and methods. The defender argued that the words in the patent were clear and that their 'obvious meaning' meant there was no infringement as certain integers of the claims in suit were not dealt with in the pleadings. The pursuer's position on the other hand was that it had set out sufficient detail to give scope for a sufficiently wide interpretation of the claims such that the defender's equipment and methods would include every integer and thus infringe. They also argued that it was only appropriate for the court to reach a decision on claim construction after expert evidence was considered.

The IP judge, Lord Malcolm, in a relatively short judgment, agreed with the pursuers, essentially on the basis that it would be inappropriate to decide the meaning of the claims of the patent in this case without some evidence from the skilled man's perspective. There would be the usual opportunity to do this via expert reports, witness statements and other evidence in the lead-up to any Proof (Trial). That should cure any difficulty that there might be with provision to the defender of fair notice of the case against it. On that basis, the application for dismissal was refused and the case will proceed to Trial.

The judge did however also make it clear that in some cases it may be possible for a Debate to be used as a suitable forum to decide the meaning of claims and agree to dismiss a case. These would be where 
'the ordinary meaning of the words used in a patent is so straightforward and clear that the precise basis for a contrary interpretation must be narrated in detail on record (in the pleadings) before an inquiry (a Trial) can be contemplated.' 
Thus there should still be some scope to employ a Debate successfully to get rid of a patent action on the basis of claim interpretation alone.

One further and more general point about this decision is that it demonstrates a willingness by the IP judges to move away from the more traditional approach of insisting on very detailed pleadings which cover all angles to allow a pursuer to proceed to a Trial with evidence etc. This approach is encouraged by the the recently revamped Scottish IP Court management rules. There is much more scope now to rely upon evidence to enlarge upon what is stated in the written case which is a potential benefit. It will tend to speed cases up and will lend itself to costs savings. As long as there is, at the same time, a means to ensure that there is fair notice given of the case to be made at Trial it seems a sensible approach to take to the issue of patent claim interpretation and generally in IP cases as a whole.

Thursday, 8 August 2013

Pharmaceutical Innovation, Competition And Patent Law: a Trilateral Perspective: a new book

Pharmaceutical Innovation, Competition And Patent Law: a Trilateral Perspective, edited by Max Planck Director Josef Drexl and Finnish scholar Nari Lee, has just been published by Edward Elgar. This book has a strong list of contributors drawn from Europe and the United States, principally from academe but with some members of the judiciary and public administration thrown in. Normally this blogger would deprecate the absence of some input from industry or private practice, but this criticism would be misplaced in a volume such as this, where the contributors have addressed real-world issues in a refreshingly direct and accessible manner, with as much attention to factual detail and commercial reality as one might expect from anyone familiar with the workings of the IP system at the point of convergence between innovation, competition and patent law.

What does the publisher say about this work?  According to its web-blurb:
"Public health, safety and access to reasonably priced medicine are common policy goals of pharmaceutical regulations. As both the context for innovation and competitive structure change, industry actors dynamically challenge the balance between the incentive for protection ['the incentive for protection' is what we bloggers used to term "profit" but now increasingly call "survival"] and the achievement of those policy goals.

Considering the arguments from the perspectives of innovation, competition law and patent law, this book explores the difficult question of balancing protection with access, highlighting the difficulties in harmonization and coordination. The contributors to this book, including academics, judges and practitioners from Europe, the US and Japan, explore to what extent patent strategies and life-cycle management practices take advantage of patent laws and health-care regulation and disrupt the necessary balance [this gives the game away: some might have expected the text to read "necessarily disrupt the balance" --  but that's a subject for another book ...] between incentives for innovation and access to affordable medicine and health care".
This is an enjoyable and thoroughly contemporary account of the shifts that have influenced an extremely important area of law and practice.  Annoying and, in this era of computerised setting pretty well inexcusable, is the lack of a table of cases and a bibliography of materials cited by the respective authors. Not everyone reads a book from cover to cover and retains a perfect recall of the authors' sources, and this small addition would give the book an element of functionality that would greatly enhance its value.

Full bibliographic information about it may be obtained from this book's web page here.

Wednesday, 7 August 2013

Late filing in German Nullity Procedure – Do Not Overstretch

After the decision “Bearbeitungsmaschine” discussed here, the fourth Senate of the Bundespatentgericht has issued a new decision with the name “Dichtungsring” (4 NI 13/11) (headnote published here. Full text of the decision not yet publised) on the late filing of documents after the time limit set in the preliminary opinion according to § 83 II S. 1 PatG and when a “sufficient excuse” according to § 83 IV S. 1 Nr. 2 PatG exists.

While the Senate points out that the combination of two claims of the patent as granted is not sufficiently surprising to be used as a sufficient excuse and that, accordingly, the objective degree of due diligence applicable would have required to search for pertinent prior art in advance, this is not the case in the event that the patentee adds a feature from the specification.

In the case at issue, the patentee had added a feature from the specification, and the plaintiff had filed new prior art relating to this amendment. The principle of “equality of arms” already invoked in the decision “Bearbeitungsmachine” requires in this case to grant permission to the plaintiff to file new documents.
 
From a practical point of view, this implies that amendments combining dependent claims will be admissible as a rule even at very late stages of the procedure, e.g. in the course of the oral proceedings, because the plaintiff is supposed to be prepared for this case. Amendments adding features from the specification should be filed in advance and could be rejected as inadmissible if the plaintiff argues that an additional search and thus an adjournment of the oral proceedings is required.  

Wednesday, 31 July 2013

Threats made to a manufacturer to sue its customers can also be actionable

On Monday of this week PatLit posted this item on liability under UK patent law for making unwarranted threats to sue certain categories of persons for patent infringement. The same topic crops up again today in Sudarshan Chemical Industries Ltd v Clariant Produkte (Deutschland) GmbH [2013] EWCA Civ 919, a decision yesterday of the Court of Appeal for England and Wales consisting of Lords Justices Moore Bick, Kitchin and Floyd). While most of the appeal court's decision was taken up with other matters, its position regarding threats is its most interesting feature. The alleged threat consisted of this line in a letter:
"Certainly you will not be interested in continuously effecting a patent infringement, which may involve the most serious penalties to the infringer and his customers"
Was this an actionable threat? Kitchin LJ, speaking for the court, explained the issue succinctly at [116]:
"The letter undoubtedly constituted a threat to sue Sudarshan. But, as both parties accepted, this is not actionable because Sudarshan is the maker and importer of the product complained of, and s.70(4) [of the Patents Act 1977] makes clear that proceedings may not be brought for a threat in respect of its activities. The question to which this aspect of the appeal gives rise is whether the letter also constituted an actionable threat to sue Sudarshan's customers. Sudarshan says it did because it conveyed to Sudarshan that Clariant intended to sue its customers. Clariant says it did not because a threat must be communicated to the person threatened. Further, the scheme of the 1977 Act is to permit threats to be made to the primary infringer, and that is just what happened here: the threat was communicated to Sudarshan".
The Court of Appeal resolved this argument, as the trial judge (John Baldwin QC, sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge) had done, against Clariant. As Kitchin LJ said at [126], having reviewed the background to the current :
" ... A threat to sue a manufacturer in respect of his own activities is one thing. In a culture which encourages parties to discuss their differences before going to court, that is something with which he may be expected to cope. But a threat to sue his customers is quite another. A manufacturer may be very fearful of the damage this would cause to his goodwill and customer connection and so prefer to cease manufacture and sale altogether. A patentee may of course be prepared to sue the customers and if he does so the manufacturer must take the consequences. But Parliament may well have thought it wrong that if the patentee is not prepared to do so, perhaps because he knows it will damage his reputation too, that he should nevertheless be permitted to secure a commercial advantage by telling the manufacturer that that is what he intends to do".

Tuesday, 30 July 2013

Crocker doesn't come a cropper as application to transfer courts fails

Crocker Enterprises Ltd v Giordano Poultry-Plast SpA is an extempore judgment of Mr Justice Mann (Patents Court, England and Wales) last month involving conditional fee arrangements and the transfer of proceedings between the expensive Patents Court and the cost-capped Patents County Court (PCC).

In short, Giordano -- the defendant in patent and design infringement proceedings brought by Crocker -- applied for the proceedings to be transferred from the Patents Court to the PCC.  Giordano, which had its own patent and design rights, denied infringing and challenged the validity of Crocker's patent on lack of inventive step, among other grounds.

 This action had not got very far before Crocker asked to amend his claims so as to include a claim for revocation of Giordano's patent and, back in March 2013, just before the change in the costs regime for patent litigation in England and Wales which effect from April 2013, Crocker entered into a conditional fee agreement (CFA) with its solicitors. Once the regime change took effect, Crocker gave notice to Giordano of the CFA and applied for a directions hearing. In response, Giordano applied for the proceedings to be transferred to the PCC where, because of cost capping, the uplift under the CFA might not be recoverable if Crocker succeeded. Said Giordano, the financial value of the claim was small, the case was not legally or technologically complex, it was agreed that the trial would last two days and in all the circumstances the case was fit for the PCC. Giordano also submitted that the parties were on an unequal footing since Crocker had entered into a CFA just before the regime change.  Crocker disagreed: the case was not as simple as Giordano said it was -- and if it was transferred to the PCC there would be constraints on the production of evidence that would curtail Crocker's ability to advance its case.

Mann J refused the application to transfer the action to the PCC. In his view:

* The patent issues appeared relatively straightforward and were the kind of issues with which the PCC was well equipped to deal. However, there were also design right claims, and these added an extra layer of complexity. The PCC could be expected to deal with those issues, but they meant that the case could not be considered as straightforward.

* Crocker had begun the action in the Patents Court and wanted to continue there.  This was a significant factor to be weighed in the balance. A party had the opportunity to proceed in the PCC in an appropriate case if it so wished but, if a claimant wished to proceed in the Patents Court and the case merited it, that option should not lightly be taken away.

* The CFA had been properly entered into and Crocker was entitled to expect its case to be dealt with under the old costs regime and in the Patents Court. Transfer to the PCC would result in capping, which would be unfair when Crocker had chosen the benefits of proceeding in the Patents Court under a CFA since the costs cap was unlikely to be lifted.

* The criteria for a transfer order were set out in the Civil Procedure Rules, CPR r.30.3(2) and the main factor in favour of transfer was the low value of the claim. However, that was outweighed by the issues of complexity and the unfairness of ex post facto cost-capping.

This piece is based on a LexisNexis note.

Monday, 29 July 2013

Enough to make your hair curl: patent threats again

SDL Hair Ltd v Next Row Ltd and others; Master Distributor Ltd v SDL Hair Ltd and others [2013] EWPCC 31 is an interesting Patents County Court, England and Wales, decision on infringements and threats which emanated last month from Mr Recorder Richard Meade QC. With so much going on, it got overlooked at the time -- but it's still worth noting.

Essentially this action concerned two separate though connected cases and turned on two issues. One case related to SDL's heated hair rollers. MDL sued SDL and six other defendants, for infringing UK Patent GB 2 472 483. The second concerned SDL's claim that it had received letters that conveyed wrongful threats of patent infringement regarding the patent.

The court had to decide four things:

* Did MDL even have status to sue for infringement at all?  MDL said it was suing as an exclusive licensee under section 67(1) of the Patents Act 1977 -- but the patentee was continuing to deal in patented goods at the same time. Was that fact inconsistent with MDL having a legal right to exclusivity?

* Was the patent infringed? Everyone agreed that the heating in SDL's products depended on the current draw of the heating unit with a particular size of roller in it, and on the fixed heating time of the products.

* Were various letters which MDL sent SDL "groundless threats of infringement proceedings" under section 70 of the Patents Act, one of which was from MDL's solicitors and specifically mentioned patent infringement?

* Was Alan Howard (Stockport) Ltd --  the second-named defendant company in the infringement action -- the importer of the SDL products that it had bought? If that was the case, then threats made against that party would not be actionable by virtue of section 70(4) of the Act. As to whether Alan Howard (Stockport) Ltd was an importer, it appeared that shipping was arranged and paid for by SDL's Danish parent company, ID Hair Company -- in which case, if Alan Howard (Stockport) Ltd wasn't the importer, a threat against against it would be actionable.

How did Richard Meade QC, taking this action over from Colin Birss following the latter's elevation to the Patents Court, handle this? He ruled as follows:

* Starting with infringement, the judge saw no inconsistency between a patentee continuing to deal in patented goods and the grant of an exclusive licence. On the facts there was a real licence, not a sham: on its face it therefore complied with sections 67 and 120(7) of the 1977 Act. The fact that the patentee continued to deal in the patented goods was irrelevant. It followed that MDL was an exclusive licensee and was therefore entitled to sue.

* Since it was common ground that the heating in the SDL products depended on the way the current of the heating unit is drawn with a particular size of roller in it, and on a fixed heating time, neither of which involved a signal derived from monitoring the roller, neither of SDL's products infringed.

* Turning to the allegedly threatening letters, individually their various components cogency and, taking each by itself, would not constitute a threat. However, taken as a whole, the letters did clearly convey a threat. One was an urgent letter from solicitors that specifically spoke of patent infringement. The ordinary reader would have understood that the thrust of the letter was that some consequence was intended to follow, and that that consequence could really only be proceedings for patent infringement.  Accordingly each of the communications complained about amounted to an actionable threat under section 70 of the Act

* On the evidence, the combination of ID Hair Company paying for and arranging transport and the risk remaining with it until the goods reached the customer was enough to say that it and not the customer -- in the this case, Alan Howard (Stockport) Ltd  -- was the importer.

The judge managed all this with just two hearing days. The case provides yet another reminder of the need to be cautious about writing to an alleged or suspected infringer without incurring liability for making unwarranted threats.

Wednesday, 24 July 2013

EPO Case Law Conference Looms Large

Our good friend and reader Yonko Borisov (Conference Consultant/Academy, EPO) has just told us that registration is now open for the European Patent Office's Annual case law conference - Boards of appeal and key decisions 2013". 

Says Yonko, this conference provides a unique opportunity to meet numerous chairmen along with legally and technically qualified members of the Boards of Appeal. Participants will learn about the Boards' recent key decisions on late filings, among other enticing topics. 

For the first time ever, a mock trial will be held to convey the subtleties of a hearing.

To find out more, just click http://www.epo.org/boa-conference

When: 22 - 23 October 2013
Where: European Patent Office, Munich, Germany
Who: Primarily patent attorneys with a minimum of 4 years' experience

Guest speakers include the delightfully lucid Geertrui Van Overwalle from KU Leuven and Klaus Grabinski from the German Federal Court of Justice (Bundesgerichtshof).

The language of the conference is said to be English, though it is not clear how much this will help, given that some decisions of the EPO are said to be impossible to understood in any language known to mankind ...

Tuesday, 23 July 2013

Proposed Model Pretrial Order Limits Claims, Prior Art References

This week the Advisory Council of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit published a second proposed pre-trial order for use in patent cases. (The first proposed order, dealing with e-discovery issues, is available HERE). The newest order attempts to streamline issues in patent litigation by limiting the patentee to 16 claims asserted in a case, and limiting the accused infringer to 20 prior art references asserted as bases for invalidity. In addition, the claims and references must be selected relatively early in the case, within 28 days from the court’s claim construction order.

The order is proposed as a model for consideration by judges in individual cases, and is meant to be modified as necessary to address the circumstances. The Council notes that the limits would promote efficiency and reduce both costs and burden on the courts: 
Cases with over a hundred asserted claims and over a hundred asserted prior art references during discovery are common. The identification of an unmanageable number of products can be a problem too.
 Lack of discipline by the asserting party in preparing its case is often why excess issues are maintained. The inclusion of superfluous claims and prior art can function to “hide the ball.” The result is an asymmetric burden on the responding party (and the trial court) because the asserting party often has a better sense of which issues it will ultimately pursue.
 Excess issues, unsurprisingly, inflate litigation costs. Each unnecessary asserted claim and prior art reference must be analyzed and charted, among a myriad of other unnecessary case-management tasks that follow. These attorney chores generate disputes, frequently unrelated to the merits, which unduly burden the judiciary. The per-case resources a busy judge can afford to invest in a patent case is only a fraction of what the parties and their law firms are willing to expend.
 Focusing patent cases to the issues at the core of the dispute will reduce the burden on courts and lower the expense for the parties. In addition, a greater focus on the true issues will improve the quality of the adjudicatory process for all. 
The complete model order, with commentary, is available HERE.


Monday, 22 July 2013

Italians hold conference on new EU patent regime

Italy has committed itself to the Unified Patent Court, even though it has declined to join the unitary patent system.  What might this mean in practice for the profession in Italy?  Some answers to this question may be obtained from a forthcoming conference at the University of Milan, the details of which can be obtained from Professor Costanza Honorati.

University of Milano-Bicocca
Friday 27 September 2013 – Aula Martini U6-4

The EU Patent System: the European Patent With Unitary Effect And The Unified Patent Court

with the support of:
European Commission Representation in Italy, Italian Ministry of Economic Development
AIPPI (International Association for the Protection of Intellectual Property – Italian Group)

9.00 – Registration of participants
9.15 – Welcome speeches: Prof. Marcello Fontanesi – Rector, University of Milano-Bicocca, Dr. Fabrizio Spada – Director, European Commission Representation, Office in Milan

9.30 – Morning session:

The Substantive Law
Chair: Prof. Dr. Hanns Ullrich (Max-Planck Institute for Intellectual Property and Competition Law, München)

The Long Road from EC Patent to Patent with Unitary Effect: Potentials and Challenges Ahead
Michael König – Head of Unit, Industrial Property, DG Internal Market, EU Commission

La cooperazione rafforzata in materia di brevetti e il controllo della Corte di giustizia UE
(The Enhanced Cooperation on Patents and the Control by the CJEU)
Prof. Fausto Pocar – University of Milan, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia

Natura e contenuto del brevetto con effetto unitario
(The Legal Nature and the Content of the Patent with Unitary Effect)
Prof. Giovanni Guglielmetti – University of Milano-Bicocca

10.30-10.50  Coffee-break

The European Patent with Unitary Effect and the European Patent Office
Prof. Manuel Desantes Real – University of Alicante, Former Vice-President EPO

La concorrenza di discipline di fonte diversa nel brevetto ad effetto unitario
(Concurring Sources of Law in the Legal Regime of the Patent with Unitary Effect)
Prof. Vincenzo Di Cataldo – University of Catania

La collocazione normativa delle disposizioni di diritto sostanziale e la loro interpretazione pregiudiziale
(The Legal Frame for Substantive Law Provisions and their Referral to the ECJ for Preliminary Ruling)
Prof. Giandonato Caggiano – University of Roma Tre

12.00 – Interventions
Dr. Francesco Macchetta – IP Director, Bracco Imaging

14.30 – Afternoon session:                                                                             

The Judicial Frame
Chair: Prof. Riccardo Luzzatto (University of Milan)

The Institutional Framework for the Enforcement of European Patents and European Patents with Unitary Effect: a View from the Hague Conference
Prof. Marta Pertegás – First Secretary, Hague Conference of Private International Law, The Hague

La natura del Tribunale unificato tra tribunale nazionale «comune agli Stati» e tribunale internazionale
(The Unified Patent Court between a National Court “Common to the Member States” and an International Court)
Prof. Roberto Baratta – University of Macerata, Legal Advisor, Permanent Representation of Italy in Brussels

Le Rules of Procedure e i rapporti tra Tribunale unificato e giudice nazionale
(The Rules of Procedure and the Relations between the Unified Patent Court and National Courts)
Dr. Marina Tavassi – President of the IP Specialised Section, Milan Tribunal

15.45-16.10  tea-break

Il diritto applicabile dal Tribunale unificato: diritto UE, diritto internazionale, diritto interno
(The Law Applicable by the Unified Patent Court: EU Law, International Law, National Law)
Prof. Costanza Honorati – University of Milano-Bicocca

La ‘biforcazione’ tra azioni di validità e azioni di contraffazione: ragioni teoriche e problemi applicativi – (‘Bifurcation’ of Revocation and Infringement Actions: Theoretical Reasons and Practical Problems)
Prof. Marco Ricolfi – University of Turin

Il ruolo del patent attorney di fronte al Tribunale unificato
(The Role of Patent Attorneys Before the Unified Patent Court)
Dr. Micaela Modiano – European Patent Attorney

17.30 – Interventions and discussion
Dr. Francesca Ferrari – University of Insubria
Dr. Benedetta Ubertazzi – University of Macerata
Dr. Lidia Sandrini – University of Milan

18.30 –Conference closes

Scientific Coordinator: prof. Costanza Honorati

The Conference will be held in English and in Italian. Simultaneous translation will be provided

Friday, 12 July 2013

Injunctions for Standard-Essential Patents: a new article with a European perspective

Recently published in the Journal of Competition Law & Economics (2013) 9 (2): 285-311 is an article, "Injunctions for Standard-Esential Patents: Justice is not blind". The authors are Peter Camesasca, Gregor Langus, Damien Neven and Pat Treacy .  I'm not familiar with the first three authors but the fourth, Pat Treacy, is a partner at Bristows who has long specialised in areas of interface between IP and competition law and who is also a founder member of the Editorial Board of the Journal of Intellectual Property Law & Practice (JIPLP)which I edit.

 According to the abstract:
"Leading competition authorities such as DG Competition (“DG COMP”) and the U.S. agencies have recently expressed concern about the potential for injunctions to be used by owners of patents declared essential to a standard (SEP) to extract excessive royalties from licensees (that is, hold up). This was a central issue in the agencies' review of the acquisition of Motorola Mobility by Google in 2011, following which DG COMP opened investigations against Samsung and Motorola Mobility in early 2012 to assess whether these companies may have abused some of their essential patents.

This article aims to contribute to the debate on the merit of the availability of injunctions for SEPs. We address the perception that the current system contains inadequate protection for licensees against the risk of hold up on the part of SEP owners through the application for injunctions. We provide an overview of court procedures currently in place across key jurisdictions and argue that the risk of hold up is overstated and that serious consideration should be given in the policy debate to the risk of reverse hold up by the licensees before contemplating change. Importantly, our analysis takes into account the possibility of opportunistic behavior by prospective licensees. This feature has been noted before but not explicitly modeled so far."
If this article is of any interest to you and you are not a subscriber to JCLE, you can still purchase short-term online access to it via the journal's website here.

Wednesday, 3 July 2013

Fallacy buried as UK courts about-turn on damages for infringing invalid patents

The UK Supreme Court gave a very welcome judgment this morning in Virgin Atlantic Airways Limited v Zodiac Seats UK Limited (formerly known as Contour Aerospace Limited) [2013] UKSC 46, on appeal from [2009] EWCA Civ 1062.  The line-up was Lord Neuberger (President), Lady Hale, Lord Clarke, Lord Sumption, Lord Reed and Lord Carnwath.  According to the very useful Press Release from the Court:
BACKGROUND TO THE APPEAL 
Virgin obtained judgment from the English Court of Appeal (“the CA”) against Zodiac for damages to be assessed for the infringement of certain claims (“the relevant claims”) in a European Patent. The CA found their patent to have been valid and infringed by Zodiac. Subsequently, the Technical Board of Appeal (“the TBA”) of the European Patent Office (“the EPO”) ruled that that the relevant claims were invalid because they had been anticipated in prior art, and retrospectively amended the patent so as to remove, with effect from the date of grant, all the relevant claims. 
Virgin submitted that it was nevertheless entitled to recover damages for infringement because the CA’s conclusions - that the patent (including the relevant claims) was valid and that the relevant claims were infringed by Zodiac - were res judicata as between it and Zodiac on the subsequent assessment of damages, and that it was not open to Zodiac to reply on the TBA’s amendment to the patent, as this would be inconsistent with the orders made by the CA. That argument had succeeded before the CA in similar circumstances in previous cases, and the CA had followed those decisions in the present case. Zodiac’s case is that the unamended patent has been retrospectively amended, and that the relevant claims therefore no longer exist, and are deemed never to have existed. It submits that no issue of res judicata arises because that was not the situation considered by the CA. 
JUDGMENT 
The Supreme Court unanimously allows the appeal and declares that Zodiac are entitled to rely on the amendment of patent in answer to Virgin’s claim for damages on the enquiry. Lord Sumption gives the lead judgment, Lord Neuberger gives a concurring judgment, and the other members of the Court agree with both judgments. 
REASONS FOR THE JUDGMENT 
After a review of the law of res judicata [17-26], the Court gives two related reasons why Zodiac cannot be precluded from relying on the decision of the TBA on the enquiry as to damages. One is that it is relying on the more limited terms of a different patent which, by virtue of the TBA’s decision, must at the time of the enquiry be treated as the one that existed at the relevant time, whereas the unamended patent, relied on by Virgin, must be treated as if it had never existed. The second reason is that Zodiac is not seeking to reopen the validity of the relevant claims, which was one of the questions determined by the CA. The invalidity of those claims may be the reason the TBA amended the patent, but Zodiac is relying on the mere fact of amendment, not the reasons why it happened [27, 53, 54]. 
The CA reached a different conclusion because it followed a line of cases holding that a patentee, whose patent (in proceedings against a particular defendant) is found to be valid and infringed, is entitled to claim damages from the defendant for the infringement without regard to a subsequent revocation of the patent, even though as a matter of English law the revocation of a patent for invalidity relates back to the date of grant [28, 48]. 
The Court holds that this line of cases was wrongly decided. Their major fallacy is the assumption that cause of action estoppel was absolute generally rather than absolute only as regards points actually determined by the earlier decision. Accordingly, the decisions in those cases had no regard to the fact that the consequences of the patent’s subsequent revocation had not been, and could not have been, determined, or even taken into account, in the earlier decision, because it had not happened by the time of that decision. They were also wrong to suppose that, by taking into account the subsequent revocation, a court would be rehearing the question of validity decided by the judgment on liability. 
The revocation was a decision in rem determining the status of the patent as against the world [32, 48]. It had been revoked by the authority which had granted it and it must be treated as never having existed. The issue raised on the enquiry was not invalidity but revocation [32]. 
Accordingly, where judgment is given in an English court that a patent (whether English or European) is valid and infringed, and that patent is subsequently revoked or amended (whether in England or at the EPO), the defendant is entitled to rely on the revocation or amendment on the enquiry as to damages [35]. 
The Supreme Court also proposed that the current procedural guidelines laid down by the CA, which propose that the English court should normally refuse to stay its own proceedings if it would be likely to resolve the question of validity significantly earlier than the EPO, should be re-examined [38, 69].
An early comment on this decision comes from Hogan Lovells LLP, which states as follows:
  • Lord Sumption's judgment states that the major fallacy of the previous line of cases was the assumption that cause of action estoppel was absolute generally, rather than absolute only as regards points actually determined by the earlier decision.  Since the consequences of the parallel revocation of a patent could not have been decided in these cases prior to the damages inquiry (since it had not happened), there was no true cause of action estoppel.  The inquiry would not be asked to rehear the question of the validity of the patent – rather deal with the consequences of its revocation ab initio.

  • ...  this decision applies to the subsequent revocation of a patent both by the EPO and in England.  It therefore applies not only in cases with equivalent facts to the Virgin case (parallel UK and EPO proceedings between the same parties), but also where two parties separately attempt to revoke a patent and only the later action is successful (as in the Coflexip case).

  • The Supreme Court heard argument on the comparable position in other European jurisdictions [an increasingly frequent practice, in keeping with the spirit of judicial comity which has recently spread though the European IP judiciary] but did not rely on comparative law in its decision.  Whilst it appears that there is no consensus across Europe, this decision brings UK procedure closer to that in Germany, where restitution is available, and into line with the position in France (where damages which have already been paid are not recoverable, but revocation of the patent prior to payment will extinguish the right on which the patentee bases his claim for damages).

  • ... this decision does not impact on the general rule that, whilst a successful claimant is entitled to pursue an inquiry for damages even if there is a possibility of an appeal, He usually does so at his own risk as to costs if the decision on liability is reversed on appeal.  The situation in Virgin only bites once the appeals process has been exhausted, i.e. there is a final decision on liability.

  • In addition, this decision does not change the position where a damages enquiry has been concluded before the patent is revoked.  In this case, the final judgment for damages will only fall to be challenged on appeal, if an appeal is still open.   Once the damages have been paid, the infringer would need to bring a claim in restitution to seek recovery of the amounts paid.  This is one of the reasons why the Supreme Court has asked the lower courts to review the procedural guidelines which currently suggest that English Courts should normally refuse a stay if the English Court would be likely to resolve the question of validity significantly before the EPO. 

Monday, 1 July 2013

Patent litigation survey: can you help?

Lord Justice Jackson
Afro-IP blogger and intellectual property enthusiast Kingsley Egbuonu, who is currently studying for a LLM at City Law School specialising in civil litigation & dispute resolution, has asked us for some help. He writes:
Considering my keen interest in IP, I have chosen my dissertation topic to be based on the impact of the Lord Justice Jackson's Civil Costs Review on IP litigation in England & Wales. 
As the reforms are still fairly recent, I believe that obtaining empirical data from IP practitioners would add tremendous value to my research work. Please assist me by completing the survey and, if you see that there is something that I should be aware of in this particular area of research, please also kindly alert me to it.

This survey is designed to get your views on Lord Justice Jackson's Review of Civil Litigation Costs (the Jackson Reforms) and their relevance to intellectual property litigation in England and Wales. The questions cover the key reforms mostly relevant to the Patents County Court.
Thank you very much for your co-operation and support.
Click the link to enter Kingsley's Jackson Reforms Survey.

Click here for a full set of references to the Jackson Reforms on PatLit