Tuesday, 28 April 2015

Disclosure of commercial licences: a new strategy for dealing with non-practising entities?

From Ian Wood (Charles Russell Speechleys LLP) comes a hot-off-the-press judgment which, Ian suggests, may be a new weapon to use against patent trolls.  Ian explains:
In what the judge, Arnold J, himself characterises as unprecedented, a company accused of infringing a patent (Big Bus) applied to the High Court for the owner of the patent (Ticketogo) to disclose the commercial contracts it had with existing licensees under the patent before court proceedings were brought. It sought this information in order to assess whether it should defend the claim (which would be expensive) or to seek a commercial settlement in advance of legal action. The judge agreed that the owner of the patent (Ticketogo) should disclose the licence agreements.

The Big Bus Company operates open-top bus sightseeing tours. Ticketogo has a ticketing system patent which provides a method of issuing tickets over the internet using a barcode in an image file format. Ticketogo does not conduct any business except patent licensing. Who are we to say that Ticketogo might be a patent troll?

In October 2012, Ticketogo contacted Big Bus notifying it of the existence of the patent, saying that Big Bus’s ticketing system infringed its patent and offering to license the patent to Big Bus if commercial terms could be agreed. Big Bus denied that its ticketing system infringed the patent.

Ticketogo’s lawyers responded by referring to the high costs involved in challenging the validity of a patent and listing other licensees who, they (i.e. Ticketogo’s lawyers) said, “presumably decided after due consideration not to attempt a challenge to the validity of the patent.”

All went quiet for a while but, in February 2015, new solicitors instructed by Ticketogo (Taylor Wessing) wrote again saying that Ticketogo believed that Big Bus, “requires a licence of the patent. Many others have decided to take a licence,” and attached a current list of 43 licensees. To many, including the judge, this would appear that Ticketogo was threatening litigation -– and the licences were relevant to its claim.  Accordingly, Big Bus sought pre-action disclosure (under suitable confidentiality provisions) of the patent licences previously granted by Ticketogo in order to help it quantify the value of the claim for patent infringement that could be brought against it by Ticketogo. Big Bus said that, because of the potential irrecoverable costs it might incur even if it was successful in any patent infringement proceedings, it was willing to resolve the dispute through a commercial agreement. However, to do so it needed first to establish the value of Ticketogo’s claim.

Big Bus applied to the High Court of Justice (Patents Court) asking for Ticketogo to be required to disclose commercial details of the licences it had granted to others using its patent in advance of infringement proceedings that Ticketogo might pursue against Big Bus.   The judge decided that this pre-action disclosure should be made.
The case is The Big Bus Company v Ticketogo Ltd [2015] EWHC 1094 (Pat). It's not yet on BAILII but should be. Ian Wood acted together with David Fyfield on behalf of Big Bus; Taylor Wessing acted for Ticketogo. 

Monday, 27 April 2015

Federal Circuit’s Initial Reaction to Teva: “Clearly Erroneous” Review Standard Not Implicated In Most Cases

In the nearly three months since the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that subsidiary factual findings in claim construction proceedings must be reviewed for clear error, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has decided a handful of cases requiring it to review claim construction rulings by a district court or the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office. The Federal Circuit has declined to extend deference in any of those cases, and by all indications it is unlikely to do so in many future cases.

Prior to January 20, 2015, the Federal Circuit reviewed claim construction rulings – including subsidiary factual findings – de novo, without affording any deference to the findings or reasoning of the lower court. See Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc). In Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., ___ U.S. ___ (Jan. 20, 2015), the Supreme Court held that district court factual findings based on extrinsic evidence are subject to “clearly erroneous” review under Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a)(6). This more deferential standard applies even if the fact finding is “nearly dispositive” of the ultimate legal question of claim interpretation.

The Teva Court indicated that in reviewing claim construction rulings, the Federal Circuit should review the ultimate ruling on claim construction de novo. If the district court only considered intrinsic evidence (the claim language, specification, and prosecution history), then the entire question of claim construction is subject to de novo review. If, however, the district court ventured into extrinsic evidence (such as expert or inventor testimony), then those specific factual findings are entitled to deference and must be reviewed for clear error. Despite that deference, however, the Federal Circuit still reviews the ultimate claim construction ruling de novo.

In practice, Teva’s effect on Federal Circuit review of claim construction rulings may prove to be limited. The appeals court has held that extrinsic evidence – the only type of finding now afforded any deference – is much less significant in the claim construction analysis than intrinsic evidence. See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“We have viewed extrinsic evidence in general as less reliable than the patent and its prosecution history in determining how to read claim terms”). In fact, the Federal Circuit has rarely, if ever, expressly relied on extrinsic evidence when interpreting a claim. It is not likely to start relying on extrinsic evidence following Teva. A review of Federal Circuit cases since Teva illustrates the decision’s limited impact to date.

PTAB Ex Parte Proceedings

The Federal Circuit has addressed Teva in two cases arising from ex parte appeal proceedings before the USPTO Patent Trial and Appeal Board. In In re Imes, 778 F.3d 1250 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 29, 2015), the Federal Circuit reversed a PTAB ruling cancelling claims in a reexamination. The court rejected the USPTO’s construction of the term “wireless” based on an express and unambiguous definition of the term provided in the specification. As a result, the court noted that, “Nothing in this case implicates the deference to fact findings contemplated by the recent decision in Teva[.]” 778 F.3d at 1252 n.1.

In a more recent case involving an ex parte appeal from a final rejection, the Federal Circuit also stated that its review of the USPTO’s claim interpretation did not implicate the Teva standard. In re Bookstaff, No. 2014–1463 (Mar 26, 2015). The court reversed the USPTO’s construction of the term “data that is indicative of a gratuity to be charged” based on the specification and disclosed embodiments, without considering any extrinsic evidence.

PTAB AIA Proceedings

The Federal Circuit addressed the standard for reviewing claim interpretation during an AIA post-grant proceeding in one case, In re Cuozzo Speed Technologies, LLC, 778 F.3d 1271 (Fed. Cir. 2015). After holding that the Teva decision is applicable to PTAB trial appeals, the Federal Circuit proceeded to exercise de novo review. The PTAB based its interpretation of the challenged claim on the patent specification and prosecution history. As a result, the Federal Circuit noted that, “Because there is no issue here as to extrinsic evidence, we review the claim construction de novo.”

District Court Actions

In two appeals from district court judgments, the Federal Circuit also declined to apply Teva’s clearly erroneous standard. In Fenner Investments, Ltd. v. Cellco Partnership, 778 F.3d 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2015), the court noted the Teva standard, but affirmed the district court’s construction of the term “personal identification number” based on the specification and statements made in the prosecution history.

In Enzo Biochem Inc. v. Applera Corp., ___ F.3d ___, (Fed. Cir. Mar 16, 2015), the court considered an appeal from a jury verdict of infringement. The district court ruled that the asserted claim covered both direct and indirect modes of detecting nucleotide probes, based in part on expert testimony that a figure in the patent specification disclosed an example of direct detection. On appeal, the Federal Circuit reversed in a 2-1 decision, relying on claim language and statements in the specification. The majority considered arguments based on the expert testimony to be waived on appeal, but noted that, “Nevertheless, even if we were to consider the district court’s finding, which would be subject to review for clear error under Teva, this sole factual finding does not override our analysis of the totality of the specification, which clearly indicates that the purpose of this invention was directed towards indirect detection, not direct detection.” In a dissent, Judge Newman argued that the district court’s construction was based on specific findings, including those based on expert testimony, and that, “These factual findings are entitled to deference, in accordance with the Court’s instruction in Teva[.]” She accused the majority of “ignoring the testimony and the district court’s findings and the jury verdict based on the evidence at trial.”

In Teva, the Court established that, when construing claims, appropriate deference must be given to the findings of the district court. The district court received some conflicting testimony, along with concessions on cross-examination, from which the court concluded that “at least one component” may include “the whole signaling moiety.” My colleagues show error of neither fact nor law in the court’s findings and conclusions.

Conclusion

 It is difficult to predict the long-term impart of Teva based on the limited number of Federal Circuit decisions applying it. The cases suggest, however, that the Federal Circuit likely will continue to apply de novo review when it resolves claim construction issues based on intrinsic evidence. In addition to situations where the USPTO or district court only considered intrinsic evidence, this approach may extend to situations in which courts considered extrinsic evidence, including expert testimony, but the Federal Circuit views the evidence to be insubstantial to the claim construction analysis.

Friday, 24 April 2015

Data Shows Spike In Patent Attorney Fee Motions And Awards After Octane

Prior to last year’s U.S. Supreme Court decisions in Octane Fitness LLC v. Icon Health & Fitness, Inc, 134 S. Ct. 1749 (2014) and Highmark, Inc. v. Allcare Health Mgmt. Sys., 134 S. Ct. 1744 (2014), district courts in the United States awarded attorney fees in patent cases only in extreme circumstances. In Octane, however, the Court lowered the bar for fee awards. Furthermore, in Highmark, the Court made it clear that district court judges have broad discretion in awarding fees for litigation misconduct.

The Octane Court focused on the plain meaning on 35 U.S.C. § 285, which simply states that, “The court in exceptional cases may award reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party.” The Court noted that, “This text is patently clear. It imposes one and only one constraint on district courts' discretion to award attorney's fees in patent litigation: The power is reserved for ‘exceptional’ cases.” 134 S. Ct. at 1755-56. In turn, the Court held that an “exceptional” case within the statute is “simply one that stands out from others with respect to the substantive strength of a party's litigating position (considering both the governing law and the facts of the case) or the unreasonable manner in which the case was litigated. District courts may determine whether a case is ‘exceptional’ in the case-by-case exercise of their discretion, considering the totality of the circumstances.” Id. at 1756.


The combination of Octane and Highmark has had a significant effect on attorney fee awards in patent cases. According to a recent report by the Federal Circuit Bar Association submitted to Congress earlier this year, motions for fees filed by accused infringers were granted 36 percent of the time following Octane, compared to only 13 percent of the time in the one year prior to the decision. In addition, Octane apparently has resulted in a sharp increase in the number of fee motions. In the one year prior to Octane, accused infringers filed an average of approximately four fee motions per month. That rate increased to over seven motions per month in the months following the decision.


The new Octane standard’s effect on attorney fee awards is illustrated by a recent Federal Circuit decision, Olpus Technologies, Ltd. v. Vizio, Inc., Case No. 2014-1297 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 10, 2015). In Olpus, the district court granted summary judgment of noninfringement in favor of the defendant-alleged infringer. The defendant then moved for an award of attorney fees under § 285, 28 U.S.C. § 1927, and the district court’s inherent equitable powers, citing a long pattern of vexatious conduct by the patentee prior to and during the litigation. The district court reviewed the parties’ conduct and found that, among other things, the patentee had engaged in an “abusive discovery strategy,” had used “inappropriate, unprofessional, and vexatious” litigation tactics, and had manipulated its expert testimony and infringement contentions so that the defendant faced “a frustrating game of Whac-A-Mole throughout the litigation.” Nonetheless, under the pre-Octane standard, the district court declined to award fees, mainly because case had “been fraught with delays and avoidance tactics to some degree on both sides” and the court could not say that the patentee’s tactics resulted in increased legal costs.

On appeal, the Federal Circuit vacated the denial of fees. After cataloging the patentee’s misconduct and expressing skepticism that those antics did not escalate the defendant’s legal fees, the appeals court remanded with instructions to apply the Octane standard:

Although the award of fees is clearly within the discretion of the district court, when, as here, a court finds litigation misconduct and that a case is exceptional, the court must articulate the reasons for its fee decision. In light of the court’s fact findings regarding the extent of harassing, unprofessional, and vexatious litigation, the change in legal standard by the Supreme Court, and the lack of sufficient basis to deny fees under § 285, we vacate and remand for the district court to consider whether and the extent to which fees are warranted.

Slip op. at 8.

The Olpus case is a clear example of circumstances where a fee award now is likely, even though the district court’s denial of fees would not have been disturbed prior to Octane. Although attorney fee awards are not available in all cases, district courts and the Federal Circuit have greater power under Octane to award them in cases involving bad conduct by either party, including vexatious litigation tactics and unfounded claims.


Monday, 20 April 2015

Purposive use of Information Modelling may be Patentable

The decision T 0049/99 relates to a patent application relating to a method for modelling a physical system in a computer. Inputs are various data describing the physical system and the output is an object-oriented model thereof.

The question arose under which conditions such kind of information modelling may contribute to the technical character of the invention and consequently be accounted for when assessing the inventive step.

Here is the catchword of the decision:
Information modelling is an intellectual activity and should be treated like any other human activity in a non-technical field, which is, as such, not an invention for the purposes of Article 52(1) EPC. Only the purposive use of information modelling in the context of a solution to a technical problem may contribute to the technical character of an invention.
While the first sentence is not very surprising, the second sentence might be a pointer to what could have been patentable if properly claimed.

The applicants/appellants had apparently argued that the link to the tangible application of power systems lends some technical character to the features. The BoA responds as follows:

The claimed invention, however, is not restricted to power systems; as expressly indicated in the description the invention may be applied to various types of systems, "large, complex systems" including manufacturing plants and other physical systems (see description, page 30, lines 10 ff.). Claim 1 uses the generic expression "physical system", which is actually a term including any real world system, even business and administrative organisations. 
In the light of the broad meaning of the expression "physical system", information modelling in terms of the first part of claim 1 has to be construed as an abstract non-technical activity using abstract constructs like objects, types, attributes, and relationships.

Eventually, a more specific definition of the purposive use would have helped to classify the feature as a technical one.

Friday, 17 April 2015

Self-sealed mailer patent comes unstuck

Everseal Stationery Products Ltd v Document Management Solutions Ltd & Others [2015] EWHC 842 (IPEC) is a decision of Judge Hacon in the Intellectual Property Enterprise Court, England and Wales, dating back to the beginning of this month.

Everseal had a patent for a product which still has some currency, even in the age of the internet: this product was a "mailer", this being a business communication which was folded, sealed by an adhesive around its periphery and sent through the terrestrial post. Claim 1 of Everseal's patent disclosed a mailer including an adhesive which self-sealed irreversibly under "finger pressure" namely pressure of 500 kPa or less. Claim 7 disclosed a mailer in which the adhesive was a natural rubber latex adhesive stabilised with ammonia.

DMS developed mailers which were referred to in the judgment as Mailer 1, Mailer 2 and Mailer 3. Everseal sued DMS for infringement of its patent; DMS counterclaimed for invalidity. The court had to decide whether (i) DMS's mailers fell within claims 1 and 7, and in particular whether DMS's adhesives sealed "irreversibly" and (ii) whether the patent was invalid for lack of novelty or inventive step over three pieces of prior art (Viking mailer, Faltin, and Johnsen).

Judge Hacon held for DMS. In his view:

* an adhesive self-sealed "irreversibly" if the recipient, receiving the mailer, could tell from both the adhesive structure and the appearance of the base material that it had previously been opened. If the fact that it had previously been opened was not betrayed by each of those criteria taken separately, the adhesive did not self-seal irreversibly when the mailer was first closed.

 * it could be assumed that anyone who had previously opened the mailer without permission would have taken some limited effort to hide the fact that he had done so.

* the seals on Mailer 1 were irreversible within that meaning; mailer 1 infringed claim 1 of the patent.

* infringement of claim 7 would have required Everseal to show that the adhesive used for Mailer 1 was a natural rubber adhesive stabilised with ammonia, but there was no evidence to that effect.

* experiments carried out by DMS did not enable the court to reach any conclusion as to whether opening Mailers 2 or 3 resulted in the disruption in the mailer's base material so as to demonstrate that their adhesives sealed irreversibly, and Everseal had chosen not to conduct its own experiments.

* the burden rested on Everseal to prove infringement, but it had not done so regarding Mailers 2 and 3.

* turning now to the counterclaim, claim 1 of the patent lacked novelty over the Viking mailer which had an irreversible seal and had self-sealed under finger pressure. Claim 7 did not however lack novelty over the Viking mailer.

* where lack of novelty turned on whether an alleged prior use had particular features, it was sufficient to adduce evidence which proved, on the balance of probabilities, facts establishing that the prior use had those features. In contrast, where the court was invited to infer that prior use had one or more features on the basis of primary facts proved, the invention would lack novelty only if the inference was inevitable.  Here the evidence -- that it was likely that the adhesive in the Viking mailer was a natural rubber latex stabilised with ammonia -- was not enough to establish lack of novelty regarding claim 7.

* the patent did not lack novelty over Faltin or Johnsen, since neither of them explicitly disclosed an irreversible seal.

* Claim 1 did however lack inventive step over Faltin and Johnsen, and over the Viking mailer if it did not anticipate the invention. Everseal had suggested no technical prejudice which would have deterred a skilled team, working prior to the claimed invention, from using an adhesive which self-sealed under finger pressure to create an irreversible seal.

* Claim 7 also lacked inventive step, the evidence being that a skilled person would have been expected to find a suitable formulation without difficulty.

This is a curious case, in that the litigation over this patent was commenced in the Patents County Court (PCC) in February 2010, before that court's rules were radically overhauled with effect from 1 October. The PCC then gave separate rulings on two preliminary points; the ownership of the patent was disputed; there were also a Tomlin Order, allegations of unlawful threats and two separate applications to amend the patent before the infringement action was finally heard by the IPEC.   One might be tempted to wonder whether the sequential segmenting of issues is always more efficient than trying to hear as many things as possible all in one go.

Monday, 13 April 2015

Mere Disagreement with Reasons of a Decison is not a Sufficent Ground of Appeal

The appeal in the case T 0972/13 has been held inadmissible because the grounds were considered insufficiently substantiated.

The appellant had filed grounds of appeal merely stating "We disagree with the OD [Opposition Division] in that ..... " followed by a repetition of the reasons of the decision given by the Opposition Division. No whatsoever reasons for the disagreement were given. The board concluded that the statement of the grounds of appeal did not comply with Rule 99(2) EPC because no reasons (other than plain disagreement) why the decision should be set aside were given.

After the decision reported here, the decision T 0972/13 puts further emphasizes the importance of discussing the reasons given the decision impugned in detail and not to merely re-iterate one's own arguments from the first instance or  state one's dissatisfaction with the reasons.

A further interesting point in this decision is that an order on apportionment of costs was issued, which is a fairly rare event. The appellant had indicated that it would not be represented in the oral proceedings without withdrawing its request to hold oral proceedings. This left open whether the appellant would attend to the oral proceedings without being represented by a representative or whether the appellant would not attend at all such that the defendants had to prepare and attend to the oral proceedings as a matter of due diligence. The board found that this justified an order that the appellant had to bear the costs for the defendant's preparation and attendance to the oral proceedinsg for reasons of equity (Art. 104(1) EPC).





Thursday, 9 April 2015

Plants or Plant Material are Neither Process nor Plant Variety

The Enlarged Board of Appeal has written a new chapter in the Tomato- Broccoli Saga and confirmed the narrow interpretation of Art. 53(b) EPC.

The following is a quote from the EPO-website:
In the referral cases G 2/12 and G 2/13, which were considered in consolidated proceedings, the Enlarged Board of Appeal has decided that the exclusion of essentially biological processes for the production of plants in Article 53(b) EPC does not have a negative effect on the allowability of a product claim directed to plants or plant material such as a fruit or plant parts. This applies even if the only method available at the filing date for generating the claimed plants or plant material is an essentially biological process for the production of plants, and also if the claimed product is defined in terms of such a process (product-by-process claim). In this context it is of no relevance that the protection conferred by the product claim encompasses the generation of the claimed product by means of an essentially biological process for the production of plants. Product claims or product-by-process claims directed to plants or plant material other than a plant variety thus are not excluded from patentability under Article 53(b) EPC and are allowable if they fulfil the formal and substantive requirements of the EPC (emphasis added).
The term 'plant variety' is defined in R. 26(4) EPC in the same way as in Directive 98/44/EC on the legal protection of biotechnological inventions, namely as "any plant grouping within a single botanical taxon of the lowest known rank, which grouping, irrespective of whether the conditions for the grant of a plant variety are fully met, can be:
  • (a) defined by the expression of the characteristics that results from a given genotype or combination of genotypes,
  • (b) distinguished from any other plant grouping by the expression of at least one of the said characteristics, and
  • (c) considered as a unit with regard to its suitability for being propagated unchanged.
Importantly, this definition excludes hybrid seed or plants lacking stability in some trait or generation as well as plant cells which can be nowadays cultured like bacteria and yeasts.

The full text of the decisions can be found here and here.

Tuesday, 7 April 2015

Parallel proceedings in the UK courts and the EPO: a new article

"Parallel patent proceedings between the European Patent Office and UK courts" is the title of a recent article by Paul England (Taylor Wessing) in the Journal of Intellectual Property Law & Practice (2015). The print version is not yet out but you can access it online via the JIPLP website. Subscribers to the online edition can access it as part of their subscription, while non-subscribers can purchase limited-time access from the same site.

 According to the abstract
In the European patent system, proceedings concerning patent validity can run concurrently in both the European Patent Office (EPO) and a number of national courts. In the UK, a number of cases have addressed the details of how the relationship should be managed between the courts and the EPO when such parallel proceedings are on foot.

Until recently, this had appeared to be settled by rules and guidelines that were logical, if not ideal in all their implications. However, a series of recent cases concerning the revocation and amendment of patents in the EPO have now posed difficult questions for judges at first instance and on appeal.

The solutions have required a significant shift in the UK and EPO relationship and raise awkward questions of their own about the possibility of patents being re-litigated between the same parties. This matters at another level, because the UK experience may inform the relationship between the Unified Patent Court (UPC) and the EPO in similar circumstances.

Friday, 3 April 2015

Belgians challenge national ratification of UPCA

PatLit has learned from an informed source that in Belgium the ratification statute for the Unified Patent Court Agreement seems to have been challenged in that country's Constitutional Court. This information can be found on the weblog of ESOMA, the European Software Manufacturers' Association, here

There would appear to be three bases for this challenge:
  • language discrimination against Dutch-speaking Belgian citizens, which is forbidden by the Belgian constitution, 
  • the Rules of Procedure for the UPC and possible future amendments can pass into law without being confirmed by the Belgian legislator 
  • the European Patent Office lacks judicial responsibility, in contradiction of the Rule of Law.
At least this third plea has a familiar ring to it ...

Wednesday, 1 April 2015

USPTO Responds To Public Comments on PTAB AIA Trial Procedures

Responding to feedback from petitioners and patent owners, the USPTO disclosed a plan to revise the procedural rules governing post grant proceedings under the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (“AIA”). USPTO Director Michelle K. Lee announced that although most modifications are still under consideration and will be implemented only after formal publication of proposed revised rules and a public comment period, the USPTO Patent Trial and Appeal Board (“PTAB”) will increase the page limits for some filings effective immediately.
The AIA created three new post-grant review proceedings that allow members of the public to challenge the validity of issued patents in trial-like proceedings. One of the review procedures, Inter Partes Review (“IPR”), has proven to be unexpectedly popular with challengers, with over 2,600 petitions filed through March 19, 2015. In response to the USPTO’s June, 2014 request for public input, attorneys representing both petitioners and patent owners provided comments on ways to improve the proceedings.  Director Lee responded to those comments in a March 27, 2015 USPTO blog posting by announcing new “quick-fix” improvements to the PTAB rules. The full post is available HERE.
Page Limits Increased Effective Immediately. Effective immediately, the PTAB will increase the allowed page limits for two important submissions:
  • The page limit for petitioner reply briefs will be increased to 25 pages. (The current rules limit petitioner reply briefs to 15 pages).
  • Briefs in support a patent owner’s motion to amend claims will be expanded to 25 pages, plus a claims appendix, with a “commensurate amount of additional pages” for the petitioner’s opposition to the motion to amend and the patent owner’s reply. (The current rules limit motions and opposition to 15 pages and limit replies to five pages).
Although formal modification of the page limits will require administrative rulemaking, Director Lee announced that PTAB “judges will begin implementing them through scheduling orders effective immediately.”
Additional Possible Modifications. In addition to the revised page limits, Director Lee announced that the USPTO is considering numerous other changes to the PTAB AIA trial procedures. Although the final form of these modifications is still under discussion, potential changes include:
  • A “single-judge pilot program” in which a single judge would determine whether to institute a trial. If a trial is initiated, two additional judges would be added to the panel hearing the case on the merits;
  • A significant amendment to rules governing motions to amend claims, which could “emphasize that a motion for a substitutionary amendment will always be allowed to come before the Board for consideration (i.e., be ‘entered’), and for the amendment to result in the issuance (‘patenting’) of amended claims, a patent owner will not be required to make a prior art representation as to the patentability of the narrowed amended claims beyond the art of record before the Office”;
  • Amended rules governing the evidence that a patent owner could offer in its preliminary response;
  • Adjustments to the scope of permitted additional discovery;
  • A revised rule clarifying the claim construction standard to be applied to proceedings involving on expired patents;
  • Rules to clarify how the PTAB will process multiple proceedings involving the same patent;
  • Rule amendments concerning the use of live testimony at trial. In addition, the PTAB Trial Practice Guide may be revised to promote the use of live testimony at oral hearings, when appropriate;
  • A potential rule requiring a Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 11-type certification for filings; and
  • Revised Trial Practice Guide guidelines to ensure that sufficient discovery is available for parties challenging petitions based on the absence of the real party in interest.
The modified page limits and other potential rule changes are a reminder of the changing landscape in this area, which will be impacted not only by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office’s updates, but also the Federal Circuit and possibly further Congressional reform. As the USPTO continues to fine-tune the procedures governing PTAB trials, it likely will attempt to balance relaxed restrictions with the goal of providing a streamlined, focused forum for validity challenges. As Director Lee observed in her blog post, the USPTO is “committed to fulfilling our Congressional mandate to provide a quick, inexpensive alternative to district court litigation and improve patent quality and to ensuring that the AIA trials are as effective and fair as possible.”

Friday, 27 March 2015

The Unitary EU Patent System: a new book

The Unitary EU Patent System, edited by the dynamic and thoroughly scholarly pairing of Justine Pila and Christopher Wadlow, has just been published by Hart Publishing. According to the web-blurb:
The purpose of this book is to explore the key substantive, methodological, and institutional issues raised by the proposed unitary EU patent system contained in EU Regulations 1257/2012 and 1260/2012 and the Unified Patent Court Agreement 2013. The originality of this work lies in its uniquely broad approach, taking six different perspectives (historical, constitutional, international, competition, institutional and forward-looking) on the proposed EU patent system. This means that the book offers a multi-authored and all round appraisal of the proposed unitary system from experts in patent law, EU constitutional law, private international law and competition law, as well as leading figures from the worlds of legal practice, the bench and the European Patent Office. The unitary patent system raises issues of foundational importance in the fields of patent and intellectual property law, EU law and legal harmonisation, which it is the purpose of the book to engage with.

This is a work which will enjoy wide and enduring interest among academics, policy makers and decision makers/practitioners working in patent law, intellectual property law, legal harmonisation and EU law.
This blogger hasn't seen it yet and is unlikely to see a review copy for a couple of weeks, so he thought he'd let everyone know that it was available. Justine and Chris have assembled an impressive array of contributors from the UK and beyond, so he'd expect it to be good. Since the new European patent package is still capable of being described as "work in progress", it's unsurprising that this volume is described as the "First Edition": clearly we can expect a sequel.

Further details are available from the publisher's web-page for it, here.

Tuesday, 24 March 2015

Late references to prior art: how to reach a sensible solution

VPG Systems UK Ltd v Air-Weigh Europe Ltd was an extempore ruling of Judge Hacon yesterday, sitting in the Intellectual Property Enterprise Court (IPEC), England and Wales. It will never hit the law reports, but at least it was noted on the Lawtel subscription-only service. It's one of those small but revealing cases that shows how a low-tier court goes about its unglamorous daily business of resolving disputes as efficiently and economically as possible, given the obstacles facing the judge (otherwise known as the parties).

In short, this was all about a pre-trial case management conference in a standard infringement claim where the defendant alleged invalidity. The lists of issues had been determined at a case management conference, following which the defendant sought to include reference to a new item of prior art. Although that item of prior art had not been referred to in the original list of issues, it was not one that surprised anyone since it had been mentioned both in the pleadings and in evidence.

The defendant submitted that its expert had not realised, before the case management conference, that certain documents relating to the new item of prior art were available. It also argued that, since the relevant item of prior art had been referred to in the pleadings and in the evidence, in that sense it was already part of the material before the court.

Judge Hacon granted the defendant's application.

First, the bad news for the applicant: the primary difficulty for the defendant was one of the provisions of the Civil Procedure Rules, CPR r.63.23(2), which deliberately made it difficult for parties to add material into the case after the first case management conference. What's more, the fact that the expert had not realised that documents relating to the relevant piece of art were available before the first case management conference did not constitute an exceptional reason that could justify the proposed amendment.

What about the good news? Given that the prior art had been referred to in the pleadings and in evidence, it could not be said that the defendant was seeking to submit new material into the case; rather, it was seeking to rely on the new material as a specific item of prior art.  This being so, r.63.23(2) did not of itself provide a barrier to allowing the amendment -- and there wasn't any other barrier to allowing the specific item of prior art to be added into the list of issues. Plainly it was an item of prior item with which the patentee was familiar, it having been referred to in the pleadings and in the evidence, and therefore it had to be something that was well within the patentee's contemplation, and there was no real prejudice to the patentee in allowing the defendant to rely on it.

Now for the qualification: since its application would be allowed, the defendant would not be permitted to put in any material relating to the item of prior art that was not already before the court in the form of disclosure or evidence.

This seems to be a neat solution, protecting the interests of both parties and enabling the court to have a better stab at either invalidating or affirming the status of a patent that might well be of interest to others in the same market.

Monday, 23 March 2015

No new substance, no admissibility - T2077/11

The decision T2077/11  of the EPO's technical board of appeal is a warning for all those who appreciate the art of copy & paste in appeal proceedings.

The appellant had filed a voluminous writ with grounds of appeal against a decision in opposition proceedings. Further scrutiny revealed that most of what was said therein was a copy of the grounds of opposition. Some additional phrases like "contrary to the contested decision" were sprinkled throughout the text but no new substantive arguments were added and none of the reasons given by the opposition division why the arguments of the appellant/opponent was wrong was discussed.

Disregarding what was a copy of the arguments filed in the first instance, the board of appeal summarizes the grounds of appeal as follows:
In fact, the appellant's statement of grounds can be summarised as follows: "We disagree with the contested decision. Contrary to the opinion of the opposition division the subject-matter of claim 1 according to the first auxiliary request fails to meet the requirements of sufficiency of disclosure (Article 100(b) EPC) and does not involve an inventive step (Article 56 EPC) for the reasons given in our grounds of opposition (reproduced here)."
The appellant submitted that the reproduced arguments did substantiate the grounds of opposition and were to be considered correct despite of the finding to the contrary in the first instance. However, the board notes that substantiation of the appeal requires discussing the reasons given for the decision of the first instance, not the grounds of opposition:
The appellant is of course correct in stating that there is nothing in the EPC or in the case-law that prohibits a party from repeating arguments presented during the previous proceedings. This approach however ignores the fundamental function of appeal proceedings, whether ex parte or inter partes, which is the judicial review of a contested decision. To this end it is foreseen that all decisions subject to appeal must set out the reasons supporting the conclusion reached having duly considered all the facts and arguments of the parties (Article 111(2) EPC). By the same token, the party contesting the reasoned decision is expected to consider and rebut at least one of those reasons in its effort to prove that the impugned decision is wrong and should be set aside. (emphasis added)

Friday, 20 March 2015

Patent litigation in Japan: Chief Judge speaks on latest developments

There's a fascinating and highly educative event coming up next month in London, thanks to the generosity of its sponsors and the kindness of its hosts -- our friends the Chartered Institute of Patent Attorneys (CIPA) and the IP Lawyers Network Japan,  The details of this attraction look like this:

Recent Developments in Patent Litigation in Japan

13 April 2015
Time: 5:30-6:30 pm, followed by drinks & canapés thanks to generous contributions from the co-host IP Lawyers Network Japan and sponsors: Asahi Breweries Ltd, Canon Europe Ltd, Fujitsu, Honda Motor Europe Ltd., Kameda Seika Co Ltd, and Niigata University.
CIPA and the IP Lawyers Network Japan are pleased to announce a joint seminar inviting the new Chief Judge of the Japan Intellectual Property High Court (an appeal court), Judge Ryuichi Shitara, as the speaker.
The talk will cover the following topics:
Overview of procedures and recent trends
Introduction to the latest notable IP High Court’s Grand Panel judgments:
  •   FRAND SEP, injunction and damages: Apple v Samsung
  •   Patent term extension: Genentech v Japan Patent Office
Speaker: Judge Ryuichi Shitara, Chief Judge of the Japan Intellectual Property High Court
Price: Free for both members and non-members
CPD: 1 Hour
CIPA members must book on this seminar using the 'book me on event' button [this link should, with luck, lead to the right page]. If non-members or ITMA members wish to book, or for more information on the event, please email cpd@cipa.org.uk.
Fancy writing a report on this event for the CIPA Journal in exchange for a free place? For more information or to volunteer, please contact cpd@cipa.org.uk.

Thursday, 19 March 2015

Patent litigation in England and Wales 2007-2013: is it a predictor for UPC behaviour?

Thanks to IP scholar and enthusiast Luke McDonagh my attention has been drawn to Examining Patent Cases at the Patents Court and Intellectual Property Enterprise Court 2007-2013, a 24-page report on patent litigation in England and Wales which was prepared by Luke together with two other scholars, Christian Helmers and Yassine Lefouili. You can access it on the GOV.UK website here.

To cut to the chase, the report concludes:
Our data show that 445 patent cases were filed at the PHC [that's the Patents Court] during 2007-2013, whereas a total of 96 patent cases were filed at the IPEC during the same 7-year period [presumably this includes cases filed in the Patents County Court, since the IPEC has only been in existence since 1 October 2013]. This demonstrates that the majority of patent litigation in the UK’s largest patent jurisdiction – England and Wales – takes place at the PHC rather than at the IPEC, even post-IPEC reforms [I think this is a reference to the Patents County Court reform of 1 October 2010, which have that court a considerable boost]. Nonetheless, we also observe that the amount of IPEC patent litigation has increased substantially post-reforms, while over the same period the PHC has not seen fewer cases – quite the opposite, in fact.

Regarding patent-level data, it is worth noting that a very large number of the PHC patent cases - 372 - concern an EP, while at the IPEC 47 out of 96 patent cases centre on an EP. In other words, EPs tend to be the subject of PHC litigation much more frequently than GBs, but there is a more even split at the IPEC. In terms of case-level data, we show that infringement is the most common initial claim at both the PHC and IPEC; but that revocation is a frequent claim at the PHC and a frequent counter-claim at both courts [this confirms the widely-held impression of court users]. With respect to litigant-level data, we observe that more SMEs (106) were involved in PHC litigation than were involved in IPEC litigation (41) over the same period, a fact which shows that despite the increasing popularity of the IPEC, a large proportion of litigant SMEs are familiar with the PHC, something which may enter into their UPC opt-out considerations [that familiarity may not be based on choice, but on technical issues such as the damages limit].

Looking ahead to the UPC, there is little doubt that the answers to two key questions - (i) whether UK firms will begin to opt for UPs, and thus litigate sole at the UPC for these patents and (ii) whether UK firms will decide to opt-out their EPs during the transitional period, and thus continue to solely conduct litigation concerning their EPs at the PHC/IPEC, will determine how substantial and immediate the impact of the coming into being of the UPC/UP will be felt with respect to the amount and types of cases filed at the PHC/IPEC. On the one hand, if patentees decide en masse to opt for UPs instead of EPs or GBs it would seem logical that there would be less litigation at the PHC and IPEC in the coming years. On the other hand, recent survey evidence suggests that not all current patentees are actually considering doing this in the early years of the new system; some are taking a ‘wait and see’ approach (McDonagh, 2014). Indeed, in the coming years patentees may decide to maintain a spread of different types of patents – GB, EP and UP – a decision that would leave multiple potential litigation venues open, and which in turn would mean that in the immediate term the current rates of patent litigation at the PHC and IPEC may not be drastically affected by the coming into being of the UPC. Ultimately, by providing an authoritative, data-driven account of patent litigation at the PHC and IPEC for the period 2007-2013 this report makes a useful contribution to current discussions concerning patent litigation within the UK and the wider EU [I feel that, whatever value these findings have for patent litigation in England and Wales, it is very difficult to draw from them to any likely guidance as to how the same litigants might perform under the UPC].

Litigating in IPEC: a hands-on course

While competition between the various IP professions in England and Wales remains brisk, it's good to see how they cooperate in both running patent litigation courses and in making them available to those who wish to take advantage of them. An example of this cooperation is "Intellectual Property Enterprise Court – Use your rights!" This is a Chartered Institute of Patent Attorneys (CIPA) course which takes place first on Tuesday 9 June 2015 at the headquarters of CIPA, 95 Chancery Lane London WC2A 1DT and thereafter from Thursday 25 June to Saturday 27 June 2015 at Missenden Abbey, Great Missenden, Buckinghamshire HP16 0BD. What's this course all about? The CIPA website explains:
With the growing popularity of the IPEC amongst SMEs, and its more EPO-like procedures, patent attorneys are starting to take the opportunity to offer competitive litigation services. The aim of this course is to provide experienced patent attorneys (3+ years PQE) with an understanding of the procedures of the court by running a patent case study from issue to trial.

This course, which was run successfully in 2011 and 2012, will give you the tools to conduct proceedings in IPEC, either alone or with a barrister – or at the very least give you the confidence to look after your client through the litigation process. This time, we also hope to provide direct experience of the IPEC in action by arranging for at least some attendees to act as marshals in the court after they complete the course.

The course starts with an introductory day at CIPA Hall followed by a residential “long weekend” (Thursday lunch time to mid-Saturday pm). This takes place at conveniently situated Missenden Abbey, in the Chiltern Hills. Much of the time will be spent in groups of four or five working on the case study, under the supervision of a tutor. There will also be plenary sessions dealing with procedural law, case management and practical aspects of running a case and preparing for trial. There is nothing like a “long weekend” course, with hands-on experience for delivering the required levels of competency and confidence to act.
Further details of the course, which is being run by Vicki Salmon (IP Asset) and Richard Davis (Hogarth Chambers), can be found here. The contributions of Vicki and Richard will be augmented by the contributions of others, drawn from the ranks of the nation's IP barristers, solicitors and patent attorney litigators.

While this course is designed for Fellows of the CIPA, a limited number of places are available for solicitors and barristers. The course is limited to 30 delegates, to ensure that everyone gets the opportunity for hands-on learning.  The cost of the course includes accommodation at Missenden Abbey together with meals. CPD: 16+ hours Cost: Members: £1,560 (£1,300+VAT), Non-Members: £1,920 (£1600+VAT)

Tuesday, 17 March 2015

Patent litigation and dispute settlement: a conference

"Litigation and Settlements in Patent Disputes", an attractive two-day conference organised by the Academy of European Law (ERA), takes place in Trier on 7 and 8 May 2015. Its main themes are (i) how to make the best use of EU and international legal instruments and (ii) invalidity, infringement and damages actions. There is a strong cast of speakers drawn from the judiciary, academe and private practice.
  Click here for programme details and registration.

Monday, 16 March 2015

EPO petitions for review are not third level hearings

Case R 0005/14, Apparatus for circulating flows of washing and rinsing liquids in a laundry washing machine/CANDY SpA (4 March 2015) a reminder from the Enlarged Board of Appeal of the European Patent Office (EPO) that petitions for review of decisions of the EPO's Technical Board of Appeal are not third level hearings, despite the view that many petitioners seem to take to the contrary. The review procedure is an exceptional means of redress, introduced into the amended European Patent Convention 2000 with a view to rectifying intolerable procedural violations.

The review procedure, as the Enlarged Board emphasises, was never intended to operate as a third instance. As it states in its decision:
2.2 As to the substantiation of the petition, the Enlarged Board can see no evidence that the dismissal of the appeal results from any violations of the right to be heard or from other procedural defects within the meaning of Article 112a and Rule 104 EPC. ...

The reference made to gaps in the minutes to support the petitioner's argument that it was impossible to verify –in the absence of a recording of the oral proceedings – whether his arguments were indeed taken into account, or to establish the circumstances surrounding the Board's refusal of his request to hear a university professor, is immaterial: the Enlarged Board notes that all the petitioner's grounds mentioned in the petition received a written response, irrespective of their relevance or acuity. However, as shown by ... the contested decision, some of them were completely ineffective or even alien to
patent law. In such circumstances, it may well be that the petitioner has not grasped the full import of the reasons given for the decision, but if so, that certainly does not mean that the Board has infringed his right to be heard.

3. The review procedure is an exceptional means of redress created by the legislator in the amended EPC 2000 with a view to rectifying intolerable procedural violations. It was never intended to operate as a third instance. These principles were established in the first decisions taken on petitions for review (see e.g. R 0001/08 of 15 July 2008, Reasons 2 and 3). The right to be heard does not mean that the Board must accept argumentation; it must merely consider it. Equally, it does not mean that the Board has to allow requests; it simply has to give reasons when refusing them. If the Board's response does not satisfy a party, that is not a procedural violation; it simply means that the Board took a different view of the facts. And that is not a matter for the Enlarged Board. ...
This blogger is willing to bet that this is not the last time that a petition for review will be made in the hope that it will fulfil the function of a further level of hearing.

Friday, 13 March 2015

Report on possible amendments to UK law to accommodate new Unified Patent Court: little to report

It's a rather technical document, but it's quite short and it's definitely about patent litigation: published by the United Kingdom's Intellectual Property Office, it's called Technical Review and Call for Evidence: Summary of Responses. In short,
The Intellectual Property Office consulted on proposed changes to the Patents Act 1977 to introduce the Unified Patent Court (UPC) and the Unitary Patent between 10 June 2014 and 2 September 2014.

The Government received twenty responses to the Technical Review and Call for Evidence. These came from businesses which may own patents or use patented inventions, legal firms and patent attorney practices, and also some organisations representing particular business/technology sectors. Responses went into varying levels of detail, with some looking at the fine detail of the proposed legislation, and also those which looked at high level principles. Different sectors had different concerns and priorities.
You can read the document here.  If you don't want to read it, or haven't the time, don't worry: there will not be any legislative proposals springing out of it before the UK government has published its own formal Response document -- for which there is as yet no projected publication date.

What's interesting is the very small number of interested parties making responses, listed on page 7. Whether this is a result of poor publicity for the consultation process, apathy or people simply being too busy, it's a disappointing and does send out something of a message that most people aren't particularly concerned.

Thursday, 12 March 2015

Congress to Consider Alternative Patent Litigation Reform Bill

Last month, the so-called “Innovation Act of 2015” (H.R. 9) was introduced in the U.S. House of Representatives. That bill proposed several reforms of the patent system, including restrictions on patent litigation such as a partial “loser pays” provision for infringement cases. We reviewed some of those proposed changes HERE.

The Innovation Act has triggered concern in some quarters that it might go too far in limiting patent enforcement rights, especially in light the popularity of inter partes review proceedings under Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (“AIA”) and recent Supreme Court cases generally viewed as favoring defendants.

Last week, three senators introduced an alternative reform bill, named the “Support Technology and Research for Our Nation’s Growth (i.e., ‘STRONG’) Patents Act of 2015. The sponsors argue in the proposed legislation’s proposed findings that the AIA has caused “unintended consequences[,] including the strategic filing of post-grant review proceedings to depress stock prices and extort settlements.” In addition, the sponsors suggest that “efforts by Congress to reform the patent system without careful scrutiny create a serious risk of making it more costly and difficult for legitimate innovators to protect their patents from infringement, thereby weakening United States companies and the United States economy.” The bill’s findings also note that recent Supreme Court decisions in “Octane Fitness, LLC v. Icon Health & Fitness, Inc., 134 S.Ct. 1749 (2014) and Highmark Inc. v. Allcare Health Management System, Inc., 134 S.Ct. 1744 (2014) [have] significantly reduced the burden on an alleged infringer to recover attorney fees from the patent owner, and increased the incidence of fees shifted to the losing party[.]”

As a result of these concerns, the STRONG Patents Act takes a different tack in approaching patent system reform. Rather than making patent infringement actions more difficult maintain, the bill seeks to strengthen patents rights, including by reforming the still-evolving procedures in AIA post-grant proceedings, which it targets as being too favorable to petitioning parties challenging patents. Major provisions of the STRONG Patents Act include:

AIA Post-Grant Proceedings Reforms. The bill proposes changes to AIA post-grant proceedings to “ensure balance.” Changes include requiring PTAB panels to construe claims using the district court standard, rather than construing claims to have their broadest reasonable meaning; more liberal availability of claim amendments; and restoring an issued patent’s presumption of validity by requiring challengers to prove invalidity by clear and convincing evidence. The bill also would require one PTAB panel to decide whether to institute proceedings and a different PTAB panel to decide the merits of a challenge.

Pleading Standard. The bill would increase the patent infringement pleading requirement to match the standard for other civil cases under Iqbal and Twombly, including by deleting Form 18 from the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Under the so-called “Twiqbal” standard, a pleading must contain enough factual allegations to state a plausible claim for relief, but not the detailed contentions that would be required under the Innovation Act.

Willfulness Infringement. The bill would change the standard for willful patent infringement from the Seagate standard to that applied by the Supreme Court in Octane Fitness. Under the new standard, the court could award multiple damages if the patentee proves by a preponderance of the evidence that the infringement was willful or in bad faith.

Divided Infringement. The bill responds to the Supreme Court’s Akamai v. Limelight case relating to divided infringement by clarifying that in cases of indirect infringement, it is not necessary for all steps of a patented process be performed by a single entity.

Other Provisions. In addition, the STRONG Patents Act includes several other provisions, including: eliminating USPTO fee diversions, clarifying the status of universities under the AIA’s “micro-entity” fee schedule, and empowering the Federal Trade Commission to regulate abusive patent demand letters.

The STRONG Patents Act was introduced by Senators Chris Coons (D-Del), Richard Durbin (D-Il), and Mazie Hirono (D-HI). The full text of the bill is available HERE.